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Abstract 
Objective: This paper seeks to understand the changing roles of religiosity and gender 
attitudes in the employment of women in Europe between 2004 and 2016. 
Background: Religiosity and gender traditionalism are both considered to decrease the 
likelihood of women’s employment. This study argues that this relationship needs to be 
decoupled, as religiosity and gender traditionalism have different underlying 
mechanisms. 
Method: We analysed rounds 2 (2004), 4 (2008), 8 (2010), and 10 (2016) of the European 
Social Survey (ESS), which include, among other data, information on employment, 
religious affiliation, religiosity, and gender role attitudes in 16 countries (N=39,233). 
Results: We show that taking religiosity into account further increases the already 
increased likelihood of employment for Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish women 
compared to women with no religion. We also find, however, that religiosity decreases the 
employment gap between Muslim and Orthodox women on the one hand and secular 
women on the other. Including gender role attitudes in the model only marginally 
explains the employment gap. 
Conclusion: Our findings support the idea that the mechanisms that underlie the 
relationships religiosity and traditional gender role attitudes have with women’s 
employment differ. Over time, the likelihood of employment increases for women of all 
religions, except for Muslim women, among whom it drops. 








Compared to other regions of the world, Europe arguably has the highest levels of gender-
egalitarian views, the lowest levels of religious observance (religiosity)1, and the highest 
rates of women’s employment in the world, albeit with considerable variation between 
European countries (Bussemaker et al. 2017; Guveli & Platt 2020; Pfau-Effinger 2017; 
Spierings 2018). The research traditions for each of these outcomes are extensive, and are 
interlinked by a core recurring argument that over the course of industrialisation and 
educational expansion, religious observance and its importance in shaping people’s lives 
will fade, and traditional gender role patterns will dissolve, with a concomitant effect on 
women’s labour market participation (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Norris 2003; Guveli & 
Platt 2011, 2020; Guveli et al. 2016, 2017). Indeed, research has shown that religiosity is 
decreasing and gender egalitarianism is increasing for the majority populations in most 
European countries (Ruiter & Van Tubergen 2009; Guveli & Platt 2020; Spierings 2018).  
At the same time, however, a growing number of studies on the labour market 
outcomes of Muslim and migrant women in Europe have called into question the clear-
cut linkages between religiosity, gender role attitudes, and women’s employment (Brynin 
& Guveli 2012; Guveli at al. 2016; Van Klingeren & Spierings 2020; Koenig, Maliepaard & 
Guveli 2016; Diehl, Koenig & Ruckdeschel 2009; Khoudja & Fleischmann 2015; Röder 
2014). The labour market participation rates of migrant women, and especially of Muslim 
women, are disproportionately low. However, studies that have compared the roles of 
religiosity and patriarchal gender attitudes in accounting for this gap have generated 
conflicting results (Blommaert & Spierings 2019; Khattab & Hussein 2018; Khoudja & 
Fleischmann 2015; Guveli at al. 2016; Koopmans 2016; Pastore & Tenaglia 2013). For 
instance, Koopmans (2016) concluded that religiosity and patriarchal gender attitudes fully 
explain the Muslim employment gap, while others have found that these factors only 
partly explain the differences (Khoudja & Fleischmann 2015), or that religiosity has no 
additional explanatory power (Khoudja & Platt 2018).  
Connecting these two literatures may help to shed light on the question of whether 
decreases in religiosity and patriarchal gender attitudes develop simultaneously with 
increases in labour market participation, and on the question of whether developments in 
women’s labour market participation rates can be explained by changes in religiosity and 
gender attitudes. In this study, we seek to improve our understanding of these dynamics 
by assessing whether religiosity and patriarchal gender attitudes can (partly) explain 
employment changes over time and between religious groups. We theorise that the role of 
religiosity and gender attitudes in shaping employment decisions might have changed. 
This argument draws in particular from the literature on integration, Islam, and gender, 
which posits that in the context of secularised or European Islam, there has been a 
“decoupling” of gender and religion (Röder 2014; Spierings 2016; Van Klingeren & 
Spierings 2020). Building on this literature, we examine the question of whether the 
                                                        
1  We use the concept of “religiosity” or “religious observance” to denote the extent to which people follow and 
practice religious duties or prescriptions. We use “religion” or “religious group” to denote the religion with 




impact of religiosity and gender attitudes on women’s employment has developed 
differently for different religions. Taking a temporal perspective, we asked the following 
question: How have religiosity and gender attitudes affected the likelihood of employment of 
women from different religious groups in Europe over time? 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Religiosity and gender attitudes as drivers of women’s employment 
Research on how religiosity and patriarchal gender attitudes have affected the 
participation of women in the labour market is fairly extensive, and has a long tradition 
(Lehrer 1995; Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1988). Both factors are generally treated as part of the 
cultural domain of explanations (e.g., Moghadam 2013; Pettit & Hook 2005; Spierings 
2016; Steiber & Haas 2012; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk 2002). For Europe, for instance, 
Fortin (2005) has shown that perceptions of women as primarily being homemakers, and 
the belief that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay, are closely 
associated with lower rates of women’s employment. Pastore and Tenaglia (2013) 
examined the influence of religion on women’s labour market participation in 47 
European countries, and concluded that Eastern Orthodox and Muslim women are more 
likely to be jobless than agnostic women. Similarly, Guetto, Luijkx, and Scherer (2015) and 
Dildar (2015) found that both religiosity and traditional gender views are (indirectly) 
negatively associated with female labour force participation. 
Theoretically, such cultural explanations share a common logic: both piety and 
patriarchal attitudes reduce women’s labour market participation because of their 
interpretations of the role of women in the family and elsewhere in society. First, people’s 
attitudes, perspectives, and opinions inform their behaviour; thus, more conservative 
views on gender roles and sex segregation are related to lower levels of female 
employment. Second, the dominant interpretation of all major world religions is gender 
complementarity, whereby men are considered primarily responsible for and well-suited 
to earning an income, while women are mainly seen as mothers and homemakers (see 
also Schnabel 2016). Therefore, the more religious a group of people are, the more likely 
they are to have traditional gender attitudes; and, consequently, the less likely the women 
in the group are to enter the labour market. Third, these mechanisms are not restricted to 
individual-level attitudes and religiosity, as they are institutionalised through policies, 
norms, and views at the community or household level (Amin & Alam 2008; Pettit & 
Hook 2005; Spierings 2014a, 2016; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk 2002). 
While the literature specifies and operationalises these cultural dimensions in 
different ways, the predominant view is that conservative religions, higher levels of 
religiosity, and patriarchal gender attitudes feed into lower female labour market 
participation rates (Amin & Alam 2008; Bozzano 2017; Camussi 2013; Davis & Gao 2020; 
Dildar, 2005; Guetto, Luijkx & Scherer 2015; Guveli 2011; Lisaliner & Bhatti 2005; 
Spierings 2014a, 2014b). Implicit in this logic is the path from religion to gender attitudes 




the degree of religiosity in a society are strongly linked to a more unequal representation 
of women in politics and in top managerial positions in that country.  
 
Figure 1: Direct and mediating relationships between religion, religiosity, and gender 
















While it is not inherent to the logic presented above, the literature has tended to 
discuss the linkages between religiosity, gender attitudes, and women’s employment in 
the context of larger modernisation processes, suggesting that the trend towards higher 
levels of employment among women is due to secularisation and the adoption of more 
progressive attitudes (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Lerner 1958; Richards & Gelleny 2007). 
However, some scholars have argued that these developments are recursive and nonlinear 
(Moghadam 1996; Pampel & Tanaka 1986; Spierings 2015, 2018; Walby 2009), drawing 
attention to processes and changes that occur over a long period of time. In other words, 
changes in the role of religiosity and gender attitudes in women’s likelihood of 
employment should be partly or fully due to developments (such as modernisation, 
industrialisation, and secularisation) over time. 
The above discussion leads to the visualisation of the mechanism (1) underlying the 
relationships between religion, religiosity, and gender attitudes, including the formulation 
of three core hypotheses: 
We expect to find that women who belong to a religion are less likely to be employed 
than women who are not affiliated with a religion (H1). Furthermore, we expect to observe 
that the more religious women are, the less likely they are to be employed (H2a), and that 
this association partly mediates the negative impact of belonging to a religion (H2b). 
Likewise, we expect to find that the more traditional women’s gender attitudes are, the 
less likely they are to be employed (H3a), and that this association partly mediates the 




















2.2 Changing roles of religiosity and gender attitudes in different religions 
Whereas some scholars see religiosity and gender attitudes as linked, others have 
suggested that the underlying mechanisms that link religiosity and patriarchy to women’ 
socio-economic participation and paid employment differ (e.g., Essers & Benschop 2009; 
Spierings 2014a). Indeed, a closer look at the studies described above suggests that these 
linkages are not universal. For instance, Guveli (2011) showed that in Turkey, which has a 
majority Muslim population, local governments with more progressive policies and 
platforms do not necessarily provide more labour market opportunities for women. 
Moreover, in their work on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria, Amin and Alam (2008) and 
Spierings (2014b) found no clear evidence that the labour force participation of Muslim 
women is lower than that of women from other religions. Finally, Davis and Gao (2020) 
estimated the happiness gain associated with being employed for men and women 
belonging to six world religions and for the non-religious, and found that this happiness 
gain helps to explain the gender employment gap among Buddhists, Orthodox Christians, 
and the non-religious; but not among Hindus, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants.  
In short, the impact of religiosity on patriarchal gender attitudes and low levels of 
female employment is less clear than is often assumed, and might differ across religions. 
While early research on Christian denominations and Judaism has shown a fairly strong 
association between religiosity and gender attitudes (Lehrer 1995; Brinkerhoff & MacKie 
1988), scholars of Islam and gender (Glas & Alexander 2020; Glas, Spierings & Scheepers 
2018; Glas & Spierings 2019) and of the Muslim immigrant population in Europe (e.g., 
Diehl, Koenig & Ruckdeschel 2009; Röder 2014; Van Klingeren & Spierings 2020) 
arguably provide the clearest theoretical explanation for why the impact of religion varies.  
The patriarchal ideologies and gender traditionalism that emerged in male-dominated 
societies and religious traditions demand that people demonstrate their commitment and 
adherence to certain social norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours (Schwartz & Sagie 
2000). Individuals with these attitudes assign greater importance to traditional family 
values and norms, which implies that men and women have distinct roles and primary 
responsibilities in society. These sharp divisions originate from patriarchal traditions and 
from the teachings of all of the Abrahamic religions, including Roman Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam (Inglehart & Norris 2003; 
Kandiyoti 1988; Spierings 2016; Walby 2009; Epstein 2007). The assumption that women 
should look after the home and family and prioritise motherhood, and should respect the 
division of labour between men and women (with the man being the primary 
breadwinner), are among the most salient features of patriarchal cultures. 
However, different interpretations of these role patterns exist within these religions. 
Recently, extensive research has shown that interpretations of the role of women in 
Muslim societies differ. Among the interpretations that have been reported are that 
women should be restricted to homemaking; that women and men cannot interact, but 
women can work in certain settings, such as in women-only factories or services; that 
women are primarily mothers, but can work outside the home if they do not have 
children; and that mothers should have an education (Badran 2015; Blommaert & 
Spierings 2019; Lisaniler & Bhatti 2005; Miyata & Yamada 2016; Price 2015; Spierings, 




employment implications, and can shift. Moreover, it is far from exceptional for people to 
combine a strongly religious orientation with progressive gender attitudes, including 
progressive views on women’s economic roles. Such combinations are on the rise, 
especially in societies where feminism and Islam are constructed as being less 
contradictory (Glas & Alexander 2020; Glas & Spierings 2019; Glas, Spierings, Lubbers & 
Scheepers 2020; Glas, Spierings & Scheepers 2018). Thus, based on these studies, we 
theorise that the gender role implications of being religious are not immutable, and are 
informed by the larger context of the society in which they are embedded. 
Changes in views on the religion-gender linkage reflect more recent developments in 
the literature that analyses the impact of religiosity and gender traditionalism on the 
economic participation of women with a migration background. A number of studies have 
shown that women with a migration background, and especially those from Muslim 
countries, are far less likely than native European women to be employed (Fleischmann & 
Hohne 2013; Khoudja & Platt 2018; Guveli at al. 2016; Koopmans 2016; Naseema & 
Adnan 2019; Zuccotti et al. 2017). However, these studies reached different conclusions 
when they looked at the extent to which religiosity or patriarchal gender attitudes explain 
this difference (e.g., Blommaert & Spierings 2019; Khoudja & Fleischmann 2015; Khoudja 
& Platt 2018; Koopmans 2016). Furthermore, some scholars have argued that religiosity 
does not explain the differences found between religious groups, attributing them instead 
to a “Muslim penalty” (Blommaert & Spierings 2019; Daoud & Khattab 2020; Khattab & 
Hussein 2018; Khattab, Johnston & Manley 2017; Abdelhadi 2017).  
Religion’s impact on women’s employment is informed by the larger societal context. 
The relationship between religion and employment among migrant women is ambiguous, 
and there are signs that attitudes about women’s economic activities are becoming more 
favourable in Europe (Spierings 2018). The question of whether the link between 
religiosity and employment has weakened over time has not been tested or theorised for 
employment, but the literature has suggested this might occur through “decoupling” 
(Röder 2014; Van Klingeren & Spierings 2020). That is, as women become more liberal in 
their gender role attitudes in increasingly diversifying and egalitarian societies, those who 
adhere to traditional gender roles will be gradually marginalised, and will be less likely to 
seek paid employment.  
At the same time, as people’s religious affiliations and religiosity are becoming 
increasingly personal, and are disconnecting from dominant religious interpretations, 
responses to the challenges and inequalities women face are changing (Guveli 2015; 
Norris & Inglehart 2011). This process that has been theorised in the extensive literature 
on the supply side of religion (Finke & Iannaccone 1993). These scholars have argued that 
while demand for religion is constant over time, the supply of it is changing to meet the 
newly emerging needs in various societies and at different times. Therefore, religions are 
continuously reformulated, reinterpreted, and adapted to align with socioeconomic needs 
and individual lifestyles (Finke & Iannaccone 1993). The importance of the most 
dominant and institutionalised religions is fading, especially in Western Europe, but also 
increasingly in developing countries (Inglehart & Norris 2003). However, individualised 
religions and religiosities might provide a sense of belonging and identity, and often 
represent a source of spiritual and personal fulfilment. Although patriarchal gender 
attitudes inherently constrain women’s social, political, and labour market participation, 
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religiosity has various dimensions and manifestations that are open to multiple 
interpretations and experiences. Accordingly, decoupling the role of gender attitudes from 
religiosity in shaping women’s employment patterns takes time, and requires a relatively 
progressive context. This fits the setting of our study, as we are focusing on the relatively 
progressive context of European countries, while acknowledging the considerable degree 
of variation within these societies.  
When we apply the decoupling logic to our study, we expect to observe that the 
association between religiosity and employment gradually becomes weaker over time. At 
the same time, we expect to find that the connection between gender attitudes and 
women’s likelihood of employment increases over time because progressive gender role 
attitudes conflict less with the new interpretations of religiosity. Moreover, we expect to 
observe that the relationship between gender traditionalism and women’s labour market 
participation becomes stronger over time; or at least remains the same, because those 
individuals who continue to have conservative gender role attitudes tend to become 
marginalised in increasingly gender liberal societies. Consequently, we expect to find that 
the negative relationship between religiosity and women’s likelihood of employment 
weakens over time (H4), and that the negative relationship between traditional gender 
attitudes and women’s employment strengthens over time (H5). 
2.3 Variations in changes in religiosity and gender attitudes in different 
religions 
Finally, the decoupling logic presented above might take different forms among women in 
different religious groups. Religiosity and gender ideologies are more closely linked in 
traditional societies than in secular societies. Given the relatively progressive context of 
Europe, decoupling is more likely to occur in more conservative religions because the 
connection is strongest in these religions.  
Moreover, the decoupling of religiosity and gender traditionalism might already have 
taken place in highly secularised religions, such as in the Roman Catholic, Protestant, and 
Jewish faiths, whereas gender traditionalism and religiosity might be more interlinked in 
more traditional religions, such as in Islam (Inglehart & Norris 2003). Some scholars have 
argued that European societies are still in the process of developing a Euro-Islam or 
secularised version of Islam (Asad 2003; Cesari 2009, 2015); i.e., that Islam in Europe and 
in other developing countries is evolving in response to modernisation processes, with 
new interpretations and their everyday reflections engendering individualised Islams, and 
fuelling the decoupling of religiosity from patriarchy. Thus, we might expect the role of 
religiosity and gender traditionalism in shaping women’s labour market outcomes to be 
more pronounced for Muslim women because of the relatively strong connections 
between traditionalism and religion in Islam (Guveli & Platt 2020; Inglehart & Norris 
2003). A similar argument could be made for the Eastern Orthodox religion, which is 
arguably the second-most traditional of the main religions in Europe (Inglehart & Norris 
2003).  
The reasoning above implies that, particularly among Muslim and Orthodox women, 




among the most gender traditional. Consequently, we might expect to find that over time, 
the negative relationship between religiosity and women’s employment weakens more for 
Muslim and Orthodox women than for other women (H6). Likewise, we would expect to 
observe that over time, the negative relationship between traditional gender attitudes and 
women’s likelihood of employment strengthens more for Muslim and Orthodox women 
than for other women, or stays the same (H7). 
3. Data and methodology 
The European Social Survey (ESS) datasets are the only large-scale European datasets that 
allow researchers to make comparisons over time. The data have been used for studies on 
religiosity, migrant integration, and labour market participation within Europe, including 
on traditionalism and women’s employment (e.g., Guveli 2015; Guveli & Platt 2020; 
Immerzeel & van Tubergen 2013; Spierings 2018; Van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011; 
Zuccotti et al. 2017). For our purposes, the ESS datasets have two novel strengths: 1) all 
questions are asked the same way in all countries; and 2) all questions are asked the same 
way in the ESS 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2016 rounds, which allows us to trace changes over 
time. The ESS is designed to collect high-quality data on the beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviours of representative samples of the populations of the participating countries, and 
enables the analysis of continuity and change over time. We have chosen to use these ESS 
rounds because they include information on paid employment, on religiosity, and on 
gender role attitudes; as well as on education, marital status, children living at home, and 
migration status.  
The countries in our sample participated in at least three of the four rounds, and we 
included only countries with more than 30 respondents for each religious group. As we 
were analysing women’s employment, we only selected women, and excluded 
respondents for whom we had missing data on other measures, including our key 
dependent measure of paid employment. Our final analytic sample comprised 39,233 
respondents. 
3.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Our dependent variable was paid employment, measured with a question on whether 
respondents were in employment in the last seven days, coded as 1 = employed, and as 
zero otherwise. We dropped respondents still in education from the analysis, and only 
included respondents aged 18 to 65, because those are considered the working ages in 
most countries. Table 1 shows the mean employment rates of women in the countries and 
across the ESS rounds between 2004 and 2016.2 The table indicates that there was an 
                                                        
2  To produce the descriptive findings, we weighted the data for the population size, which generates more 
representative descriptive statistics. We have not used weighting for the multiple regression results because 
it increases the standard errors. Moreover, weighting by population size would drive the results towards the 
countries with the largest population sizes. Without weighting the regression results by population size, 
respondents count more or less equally across countries, leading to valid results across contexts. Therefore, 
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overall increase in the employment rates of women over this period, with some 
fluctuations in some countries – including declining or stagnating rates in 2010 in most 
countries, which were most likely due to the 2008 financial crisis (Spierings 2018). The 
highest female employment rates were in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden; while the lowest rate was in Greece. 
Religious affiliation was measured with the question: “Do you consider yourself as 
belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” We allocated those who answered 
“no” to the category of “no religion”. For those who answered “yes”, the options were: 
Roman Catholic; Protestant; Eastern Orthodox; other Christian denomination; Jewish; 
Islamic; Eastern religions; other non-Christian religions. We combined Eastern religions 
and other non-Christian religions into a single “Other” category. Because of the small size 
and heterogeneity of this category, we included it in analyses for completeness, but we do 
not discuss it in detail here. 
 
Table 1: Share of women’s employment in countries across ESS rounds 
 
ESS round 2 
2004 
ESS round 4 
2008 
ESS round 5 
2010 
ESS round 8 
2016 
Belgium 55.1 61.7 66.2 65.1 
Switzerland 68.7 67.7 75.1 76.2 
Czech Republic 55.9 61.2 60.9 72.2 
Germany 59.4 68.5 66.1 75.4 
Denmark 76.0 77.0 74.2 No survey 
Spain 58.2 58.5 59.5 63.7 
France No survey 64.0 67.6 65.3 
UK 63.3 62.4 63.7 72.2 
Greece 41.2 55.3 43.8 No survey 
Ireland 57.5 49.0 45.7 60.0 
Israel No survey 59.3 57.2 70.2 
Netherlands 61.3 64.3 69.2 70.1 
Norway 79.1 81.7 81.6 80.4 
Russia No survey 65.4 65.2 67.4 
Sweden 78.2 84.8 82.1 81.1 
Slovenia 59.9 58.0 60.5 62.6 
Total N 10,299 9,247 13,283 10,820 
Source: European Social Surveys 
Notes: Findings are weighted for population size. 
 
We included ESS rounds 2 (2004), 4 (2008), 5 (2010), and 8 (2016) in all models, which 
serve as proxies for the time trends. Table 2 shows the proportion of all religions and no 
religion in each ESS round (2, 4, 5, and 8). The largest category in the table is the “no 
religion” group; Roman Catholic women form the largest religious group, followed by 
Protestant women, and then by Eastern Orthodox women. Muslims constitute about two 
                                                                                                                                                 
we display the unweighted regression results here, but we include the weighted regression results for Table 




per cent of the sample in 2004 and four per cent of the sample in 2016, and thus represent 
one of the smallest religious groups in the ESS data (and in Europe).   
 










No religion 47.3 42.0 42.8 45.1 44.0 
Roman Catholic 28.8 20.5 19.7 19.5 21.2 
Protestant 15.7 12.4 10.8 10.2 11.8 
Eastern Orthodox 5.1 19.4 19.7 17.7 16.9 
Jewish 0.02 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 
Islam 1.5 3.1 3.6 4.2 3.3 
Other religions 1.6 1.2 2.0 2.1 1.8 
Total N 9,093 9,018 11,610 9,512 39,233 
Notes: Findings are weighted for population size. 
 
Our two main independent variables were religiosity and gender role attitudes. To 
operationalise religiosity, we used information on how often respondents prayed,3 which 
was collected with the following question in the survey: “How often do you pray apart 
from at religious services?” The answer categories were: 0 = never; 1 = less often; 2 = only 
on special holidays; 3 = at least once a month; 4 = once a week; 5 = more than once a 
week; 6 = every day. The question on gender role attitudes was repeated in all selected ESS 
rounds (2004, 2008, 2010, and 2016) using the following statement: “Men should have 
more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce”. The answer categories ranged 
from 1 = disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly.  
3.2 Control variables 
We included a number of individual-level characteristics shown to be important in 
determining women’s labour market participation. We included age to control for whether 
                                                        
3  There are two other measures for religiosity in the datasets. One is subjective religiosity, which was 
measured with the question: “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious 
would you say you are?” with responses on a scale from zero (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious). We 
ran the analyses by replacing praying with subjective religiosity, which provided similar conclusions 
(available upon request). Since subjective religiosity is more sensitive to contextual factors, such as 
discriminatory experiences or certain societal debates or events that can make identities more manifest 
(Guveli 2015), we decided to use information on the frequency of praying as our religiosity variable. This 
variable is less sensitive to contextual factors because it asks about the frequency of praying. We did not use 
the religiosity indicator attendance at religious meetings because of the high shares of missing values, 
especially for Muslim women, and because it measures exposure and socialisation, whereas our theoretical 
focus was on individual forms of religiosity. We did not construct a scale using all three measures because 
different mechanisms underlie each of these measures, and they are conceptually distinct across religions 
and between migrants and natives, with different effects on gender issues (Guveli 2015; Spierings 2019, 
Van Klingeren & Spierings 2020).  
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age might (partly) account for the relationship between religiosity and labour market 
participation. Age might also (partly) account for the relationship between gender role 
attitudes and women’s likelihood of employment. That is, it might be the case that gender 
attitudes and religiosity are more common among older women in some religions, while 
they are less dependent on age in other religions. Family structure and the presence of 
dependent children are other important factors in women’s labour market participation 
levels (Naseema & Adnan 2019; Spierings 2014a; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk 2002). 
Therefore, we included marital status as a categorical variable: 1 = married/cohabiting/in 
legal partnership; 2 = divorced/widowed/separated; 3 = never married. Finally, for having 
children, we added a dummy variable: 1= having children living at home, and zero 
otherwise.  
As the ESS provides information on each respondent’s country of birth, as well as on 
the birthplace of her/his father and mother, we could take into account the differences 
between majority Europeans (natives) and first- and second-generation migrants. We 
defined the categories as follows: natives – neither the respondent nor either of the 
respondent’s parents was born abroad; migrants (first generation) – the respondent and 
both parents were born abroad; second generation – at least one of the respondent’s parents 
was born abroad, but the respondent was born in the survey country.  
A key variable commonly linked to labour market participation is educational level. 
Women with higher qualifications are more often economically active, even if they are 
married and have children, although some may be more likely to experience 
unemployment due to discrimination in recruiting practices or to their choices or 
preferences based on their religion (Bayrakdar & Guveli 2020; Blommaert, Coender & Van 
Tubergen 2014a, 2014b; Daoud & Khattab 2020; Khattab & Hussein 2018; Naseema & 
Adnanb 2019; Zuccotti et al. 2017; Güveli 2006). We included education measured in 
years, as this was the only feasible way of proxying educational attainment across a diverse 
range of countries. A description of all of the variables is provided in Appendix A1.  
3.3 Analytical approach 
Our dependent variable paid employment was dichotomous; therefore, we estimated a 
series of logistic regressions. In our base model (Model 1), along with the control variables 
in all models (age, age2, marital status, children living at home, education, migration 
status) for compositional influences on paid work, we included only the main effects for 
religions and the time trend (ESS rounds)4. Model 2 examined the relationship between 
religiosity (praying) and women’s paid employment. Model 3 looked at the relationship 
between gender role attitudes and paid employment without the variable religiosity. Model 
4 added both religiosity and gender attitudes to determine whether they explained the 
differences in women’s likelihood of employment in different religious groups. These 
models allowed us to test Hypotheses 1 through 3. 
                                                        
4  We have operationalised time with “ESS-round” as a covariate in our regression models, which shows a 
fairly linear relationship with the dependant variable employment. However, there is a slight diversion from 




We also estimated models with two-way interactions between time (survey years) and 
religiosity (Model 5, testing Hypothesis 4), and time and gender role attitudes (Model 6, 
testing Hypothesis 5). Our final model (Model 7) incorporated all two-way interactions 
and a three-way interaction between time, religiosity, and religions, as well as a three-way 
interaction between time, gender role attitudes, and religions, to reveal changes in the 
association between employment and gender role attitudes and religiosity in particular 
religions (Hypotheses 6 and 7). Models 5, 6, and 7 are presented in Appendix A2. 
In the following, we discuss our findings on the evolution of the effects of religiosity 
and gender role attitudes on women’s paid employment. The odds ratios of the logistic 
regression are presented in Appendix Table A2. For the purposes of visual presentation 
and ease of interpretation, particularly given the challenges of reading results from three-
way interactions in tables, we present our main results for Model 7 (Table A2) in graphical 
form in Figures 1 and 2. We discuss the results from other models to the extent they are 
relevant to answering our main research question. For completeness, we provide the full 
sequence of models (Models 5, 6, and 7) in Appendix Table A2.  
Note that our aim was not to estimate contextual effects. Rather, we were analysing 
the evolution of the effects of religiosity and gender attitudes on women’s paid 
employment over time (across 16 European countries, or, more precisely, ESS countries). 
There has been some discussion of the best models to apply in the analysis of cross-
national surveys like the ESS (Bryan & Jenkins 2016; Te Grotenhuis et al. 2015). To 
account for all of the country-level factors that might be associated with the distribution of 
female employment rates, religiosity, and gender attitudes across countries, we included 
country fixed effects in all of our models (Clarke et al. 2015). This is a conservative 
approach (Bryan & Jenkins 2016), but it enabled us to identify the patterns we were most 
interested in. 
4. Results 
4.1 Bivariate results 
Over time, women in all religions became increasingly likely to be in paid employment, as 
Figure 2 shows – albeit with declining or stagnating rates in 2010 across religious groups 
and countries, which were likely due to the 2008 financial crisis. This pattern is also clear 
in Table 1, which displays women’s employment rates per country. Protestant women had 
a higher percentage of employment than women in any other group, and a percentage 
that was very similar to that of women with no religion across all time points between 
2004 and 2016. Muslim women had the lowest percentage of employment, but they had 
the largest increase in employment between 2004 and 2016. While Eastern Orthodox 
women had the second-lowest percentage of employment in 2004, their employment rates 
also increased in this period. Women with no religious affiliation did not have the highest 
employment share, which contradicts the assumption that belonging to a religion in 




Figure 2: Religious groups and their employment rates across ESS rounds (times) 
 
Notes: Weighted results for population size 
 
Table 3 shows the rank correlation between gender attitudes and religiosity in each 
religious group over time. The overall correlation between them for all religions was 
moderate to weak; i.e., it was 0.18 in 2004, and had declined to 0.12 in 2016. The strongest 
correlations in 2004 were for Eastern Orthodox women, Muslim women, and women in 
other religions, but they decreased sharply over time. Our finding that these correlations 
were declining supports the claim that there was a decoupling of gender attitudes and 
religiosity in religions from industrialising countries (Eastern Orthodox, Islam, and Other 
religions). The correlation between religiosity and gender attitudes was weak but relatively 
stable over time for women in all other religious groups and for women with no religion, 
which indicates that the decoupling had already taken place in religions from post-
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Table 3: Spearman correlation coefficient between religiosity and gender attitudes, per 










Overall correlation 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.12 
No religion 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 
Roman Catholic 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Protestant 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.17 
Eastern Orthodox 0.25 0.14 0.07 0.03 
Jewish 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.19 
Islam 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.06 
Other religions 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.15 
Note: Weighted for population size 
4.2 Multiple regression results 
To determine whether these differences were significant and to take into account other 
factors that might be driving them, we performed multiple regression analysis. Table 4 
shows the results for the four models used to test our expectations. We accounted for 
country-level differences with fixed effects in all models, but to avoid overly long tables, 
these coefficients are not displayed in the table. The table shows the odds ratios: the closer 
the coefficient is to one, the smaller the effect; coefficients below one indicate negative 
effects, and coefficients above one indicate positive effects. 
Model 1 shows that compared to women who were not affiliated with any religion, 
Eastern Orthodox and Muslim women and those from other religions were significantly 
less likely to be in paid employment. Jewish women were significantly more likely to have 
a paid job than women with no religion. There were no significant differences between 
Catholic and Protestant women. Thus, our first hypothesis was only partly confirmed 
(H1). With religiosity added, Model 2 shows that the women who prayed more often were 
significantly less likely to have a paid job. Religiosity fully explained the lower likelihood of 
employment for Eastern Orthodox women and for women in other religions than for non-
religious women; while the gap between Muslim women and those with no religion also 
decreased, as the coefficient moved closer to zero. The results confirm Hypotheses 2a and 
2b. That is, religiosity partly explained the lower employment rates of Muslim women, but 
it accounted for most of the differences in the employment rates of Muslim and secular 
women.   
Moreover, once religiosity was taken into account, the insignificant but negative 
relationship between Catholic women and the likelihood of employment (in Model 1) 
became significant and positive (Model 2). That is, Catholic and Protestant women were 
significantly more likely to be in paid employment than women with no religion when 
taking the religiosity of these women into account.  
Model 3 of Table 4 shows the relationship between gender attitudes and the likelihood 
of employment. As expected, and in line with previous research findings and Hypothesis 
3a, women agreeing with the statement that men have more right to have a job than 
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women when jobs are scarce were significantly less likely to be in paid employment than 
women who disagreed with this statement. However, adding traditional gender attitudes 
explained only a marginal part of the differences observed between religious groups, 
refuting Hypothesis 3b. Moreover, when both religiosity and gender role attitudes were 
added to Model 4, the results confirmed the previous results, and suggested that gender 
role attitudes did not really mediate religiosity’s impact.  
Furthermore, when religiosity and gender role attitudes were added together, their 
coefficients were not different from those in Model 2 and Model 3, which corresponded 
with the low correlations shown in Table 3. That is, the roles of religiosity and of gender 
attitudes in shaping women’s likelihood of employment were found to be independent of 
each other. This finding refuted our H3c, which stated that the negative relationship 
between religiosity and employment is mediated by gender role attitudes.  
Model 1 demonstrated that over time, the likelihood of employment increased 
significantly. In contrast to our findings regarding the differences between religious 
affiliations, adding religiosity hardly changed this positive trend, but adding gender role 
attitudes partly and marginally explained this trend. Religiosity and gender role attitudes 
thus seemed to explain the different patterns in women’s employment. 
 
Table 4: Odds ratios for the effects of religiosity and gender role attitudes on the likelihood 
of employment 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; all models include country fixed effects; all models are controlled for age, 
age2, education, marital status, having children at home, and migration status; Weighted results are 
demonstrated in Appendix A3; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Survey year (ESS round) 1.065*** 1.063*** 1.046*** 1.045*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Religions (ref: No religion)     
Roman Catholic 0.983 1.116** 1.006 1.125** 
 (0.0332) (0.0407) (0.0341) (0.0412) 
Protestant 1.066 1.194*** 1.089* 1.204*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0532) (0.0468) (0.0537) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.855* 0.964 0.871* 0.969 
 (0.0599) (0.0687) (0.0612) (0.0693) 
Jewish 1.347* 1.429** 1.286+ 1.360* 
 (0.1782) (0.1892) (0.1709) (0.1806) 
Muslim 0.463*** 0.548*** 0.502*** 0.582*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0452) (0.0407) (0.0483) 
Other religions 0.765** 0.916 0.793** 0.930 
 (0.0676) (0.0828) (0.0703) (0.0843) 
Praying (1-5)  0.946***  0.951*** 
  (0.0056)  (0.0057) 
Traditional gender attitudes (0-6)   0.841*** 0.846*** 
   (0.0093) (0.0094) 




4.3 Evolution of the roles of religiosity and gender attitudes 
To assess the changing influences of religiosity and gender attitudes over time, we 
interacted the time variable (survey year/ESS round) with religiosity (Model 5, Appendix 
A2) and gender attitudes (Model 6), and added the three-way interactions with the 
religious affiliations (Model 7). To estimate the three-way interactions correctly, we also 
interacted time with the religious affiliations (Model 7). The results for Model 7 showed 
no stark differences in the changes over time in the likelihood of employment for women 
across religious groups, except for Muslim women. Controlling for other factors in the 
model, the likelihood of employment for Muslim women fell during this period (Model 7 
of Appendix A2), which may indicate that they were hit hardest by the economic crisis, 
and were “last in line” (Blommaert & Spierings 2019). This downwards trend in the 
likelihood of employment for Muslim women found in the multiple regression model was 
contrary to the finding in the bivariate result (i.e., not controlled for education, 
parenthood, etc.) in Figure 2, which shows a substantial increase in the employment rate 
for Muslim women between 2004 and 2016. These differences might indicate that there 
were changes in Muslim women’s characteristics that led to an increase in their 
employment rate, such as an increasing level of education over time. This issue merits 
more detailed scrutiny in future research.   
We had expected to find that over time, the effect of religiosity on the paid 
employment of women would weaken, while the association between gender role attitudes 
and employment would become stronger. The association between religiosity and paid 
employment was negative in 2004, but we saw no change in this association over time (in 
Model 5 of Table A2), thus refuting H4. The association between traditional gender role 
attitudes and women’s likelihood of employment was significant and negative in 2004, but 
this negative impact on employment weakened over time (Model 6 of Table A2). This 
result contradicted our expectations, and thus refuted H5.  
Finally, in Model 7, we assessed whether these patterns differed by religious affiliation 
(Appendix A2), as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities for 
women who never prayed, who prayed at least once a month, and who prayed every day – 
the two opposite and marginal categories and the middle category. Figure 3 shows that 
when other variables were taken into account (Model 7 in Appendix A2), religiosity was 
not a significant determinant of women’s likelihood of employment over time for secular, 
Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox women. This pattern is visualised by 
the lines in Figure 3 being close to each other instead of showing substantial deviation. 
However, there were some noteworthy patterns for Jewish and Muslim women, in line 
with Hypothesis 6. Over time, the gap between more and less religious women closed, 
which made religiosity a weaker determinant of employment for the women in these 
groups. For instance, in 2004, the likelihood of employment for Jewish women who never 
prayed was substantially higher than that for Jewish women who prayed every day; 
whereas in 2016, the likelihood of employment increased significantly for Jewish women 
overall, but the difference between these two groups was insignificant. As we derived our 
logic mostly from the literature on migration and Islam, it was interesting to observe that 
Muslim women who never prayed had a higher likelihood of being in paid employment in 
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2004 than their counterparts who prayed every day, but that these groups converged over 
time without increasing their overall likelihood of paid employment.  
 
Figure 3: Average predicted probabilities from model results. Effects of religiosity 
(“How often do you pray apart from at religious services?”) on the employment of 
women belonging to different religions between 2004 and 2016 
 
Note: Controlled for country, age, age2, education, marital status, having children at home, and migration status. 
 
To analyse gender role attitudes, we distinguished between women who strongly 
disagreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, and strongly agreed with the statement: “Men 
should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce”. The results appear in 
Figure 4, which are based on Model 7 in Appendix A2. The association between gender 
role attitudes and women’s employment remained fairly constant for secular, Roman 
Catholic, and Protestant women (i.e., the lines are rather horizontal), but the association 
for Eastern Orthodox women showed some divergence over time, which was in line with 
our expectation in Hypothesis 7. That is, Eastern Orthodox women with more egalitarian 
gender attitudes were more likely to be in paid employment than their counterparts with 
conservative gender role attitudes in 2004, and the likelihood of employment of these two 
groups was becoming less similar over time. For Orthodox women, this finding was in 
line with Hypothesis 7. However, the overall expectation was not confirmed in the results 
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likelihood of employment for women with traditional gender role attitudes increased 
considerably over time for Jewish and Muslim women, and for women in other religions. 
The biggest differences in the likelihood of employment were between the progressive 
and the traditional Muslim women in 2004; the most progressive women had the highest 
likelihood of employment, and the most traditional had the lowest. Over time, the 
differences converged, with the likelihood of being in paid employment increasing for 
traditional Muslim women and slightly decreasing for the most progressive women; this 
pattern was similar to, but less pronounced than, the association between religiosity and 
the likelihood of employment over time for Muslim women.  
 
Figure 4: Average predicted probabilities from model results. Gender attitudes (“Men 
should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce”) in the 
employment of women belonging to different religions between 2004 and 
2016 
 
Note: Controlled for country, age, age2, education, marital status, having children at home, and migration status. 
5. Conclusion 
At the outset, we argued that religiosity and traditional gender role attitudes may impede 
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in the employment rates of women in different religious groups (Inglehart & Norris 
2003). After reviewing the literature on the decoupling of religiosity and gender attitudes, 
we expected to find that the role of religiosity in employment weakens, whereas the 
negative association between gender attitudes and employment becomes stronger over 
time. We examined these expectations using ESS data ranging from 2004 to 2016.   
If anything, our results underscore that it is far too simple to assume that there is a 
recursive process in which women’s likelihood of employment increases across the board, 
or to use religiosity and gender role attitudes to explain employment differences between 
religious groups, and particularly the Muslim employment gap (Khattab & Hussein 2018; 
Khattab et al. 2017). Both religiosity and traditional gender role attitudes were shown to 
impede employment, but only religiosity really explained the differences between different 
religious groups, and only traditional gender role attitudes slightly explained the 
developments over time. Moreover, after taking both factors into account, some group 
differences remained, mainly between Muslim women and other women.  
After controlling for gender role attitudes and religiosity, Catholic, Protestant, and 
Jewish women had the highest likelihood of employment of all the religious groups 
studied. When religiosity was considered, the higher employment rates for Catholic, 
Protestant, and Jewish women relative to women with no religion became more 
prominent, while the lower employment rates for Muslim and Eastern Orthodox women 
decreased. This finding of our multiple regression analysis was in line with our 
descriptive findings that women with no religion had the highest employment rates by far. 
Future research should examine the dynamics at play in the association between 
religiosity and women’s employment for women of different religions.  
Delving more deeply, we found that different religious groups were also affected 
differently by gender attitudes and religiosity. Notably, over time, the effects of religiosity 
decreased among Jewish and Muslim women; and the effects of traditional gender role 
attitudes decreased among Jewish, Muslim, and, to some extent, Protestant women. For 
all other combinations, the developments appeared to be parallel, with no strongly 
increasing effects. 
While these results support our overarching expectation that women’s employment 
rates would not follow the same trajectories for all religious groups, our specific 
expectations were only partly supported. We found support for the idea that religiosity and 
traditional gender role attitudes have their own underlying mechanisms that explain their 
relationships to women’s employment. However, our findings contradicted the 
expectation that the negative association between gender role attitudes and likelihood of 
employment would become stronger over time. In fact, it became weaker. That is, the 
likelihood of employment for women with more traditional gender attitudes increased 
over time between 2004 and 2016 – although a somewhat different trend was observed for 
Eastern Orthodox women, which was in line with our expectations. One explanation for 
these findings might be that the role of gender role attitudes in entering paid employment 
became less important because these attitudes were overridden by economic pressures in 
societies where men and women were expected to earn their own living. However, future 
research should investigate this question more in detail.  
Our research represents a starting point in the analysis of gender traditionalism and 




religions. Future research should study these associations in longer time windows, and 
look at changes over the life course. Including contextual factors in the analysis might 
shed more light on the significantly lower and decreasing likelihood of employment found 
for Muslim women, even after religiosity and gender traditionalism are taken into 
account. To conduct a detailed analysis, more data and a longer time span are needed. 
Such an analysis might also provide us with a better understanding of our finding that the 
association between gender traditionalism and employment has been decreasing over 
time among Muslim women in Europe.  
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Table A.1:  Unweighted descriptive statistics (N = 43649) 
  Mean/Proportion   Freq.     SD     Min.     Max.    
Years of full-time education  13.18  3.69 0.00 48.0 
Age 44.61  12.2 18.00 65.0 
Doing paid work last 7 days  0.64     
Country      
    BE Belgium 0.06 2390    
    CH Switzerland 0.06 2386    
    CZ Chech 0.08 3255    
    DE Germany 0.09 3635    
    DK Denmark 0.04 1472    
    ES Spain 0.06 2526    
    FR France 0.05 1890    
    GB UK 0.07 2670    
    GR Greece 0.07 2692    
    IE Ireland 0.09 3344    
    IL Israel 0.06 2427    
    NL Netherlands 0.07 2567    
    NO Norway 0.05 1922    
    RU Russia 0.06 2520    
    SE Sweden 0.05 1995    
    SI Slovenia 0.04 1542    
Children living at home 0.54     
Marital status      
    Married 0.62 24218    
    Divorced/widowed 0.23 8911    
    Never married 0.16 6104    
Migration status     
    First-generation migrants 0.11 4278    
    Second generation 0.09 3567    
    Natives 0.80 31388    
Religion      
    No religion 0.41 15945    
    Roman catholic 0.25 9970    
    Protestant 0.14 5390    
    Eastern orthodox 0.10 4035    
    Jewish 0.05 2015    
    Islam 0.03 1159    
    Other religions 0.02 719    
Survey year (ESS round)     
    2 – 2004 0.23 9093    
    4 – 2008 0.23 9018    
    5 – 2010 0.30 11610    






Table A.1:  Unweighted descriptive statistics (N = 43649) (continued) 
  Mean/Proportion   Freq.     SD     Min.     Max.    
 
Pray (How often pray apart from at religious services) 
0 never 0.37 14537    
1 less often 0.16 6370    
2 only on special holidays 0.05 1781    
3 at least once month 0.06 2386    
4 once a week 0.06 2472    
5 more than once a week 0.09 3436    
6 every day 0.21 8251    
Gender attitudes (Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce) 
1 disagree strongly  0.40 15864    
2 disagree 0.32 12724    
3 neither agree nor disagree 0.12 4661    
4 agree  0.11 4366    





Table A.2:  Odd ratios role of religiosity and gender role attitudes on employment likelihood of women in 
different religion over time (Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 are in Table 4) 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Country (Ref: Austria)    
CH Switzerland 2.156*** 2.155*** 2.155*** 
 (0.1506) (0.1506) (0.1513) 
CZ Czech 1.085 1.082 1.071 
 (0.0669) (0.0667) (0.0664) 
DE Germany 1.152* 1.148* 1.146* 
 (0.0708) (0.0706) (0.0707) 
DK Denmark 1.773*** 1.752*** 1.765*** 
 (0.1531) (0.1516) (0.1557) 
ES Spain 0.901 0.900 0.895+ 
 (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0597) 
FR France 1.132+ 1.132+ 1.129+ 
 (0.0811) (0.0811) (0.0811) 
GB UK 1.048 1.045 1.036 
 (0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0682) 
GR Greece 0.728*** 0.730*** 0.701*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0660) (0.0674) 
IE Ireland 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.571*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0363) 
IL Israel 1.060 1.046 1.057 
 (0.1337) (0.1321) (0.1367) 
NL Netherlands 1.149* 1.147* 1.150* 
 (0.0759) (0.0758) (0.0762) 
NO Norway 2.207*** 2.200*** 2.223*** 
 (0.1786) (0.1781) (0.1810) 
RU Russia 1.376*** 1.360*** 1.360*** 
 (0.1063) (0.1054) (0.1072) 
SE Sweden 2.755*** 2.743*** 2.765*** 
 (0.2183) (0.2175) (0.2201) 
SI Slovenia 1.066 1.062 1.072 
 (0.0795) (0.0793) (0.0802) 
Children living at home 0.658*** 0.659*** 0.658*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0189) 
Marital status (Ref: Married)    
Divorced/widowed 1.095** 1.093** 1.097** 
 (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0329) 
Never married 1.011 1.014 1.018 
 (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0405) 
Years of full-time education completed 1.113*** 1.113*** 1.114*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042) 
Age 1.420*** 1.420*** 1.422*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Age2 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 






Table A.2:  Odd ratios role of religiosity and gender role attitudes on employment likelihood of women in 
different religion over time (Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 are in Table 4) (continued) 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Migration status (Ref: First generation migrant)    
Second-generation  1.099+ 1.100+ 1.100+ 
 (0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0592) 
Natives 1.297*** 1.298*** 1.298*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0527) 
Religion (Ref: No religion)    
Roman Catholic 1.125** 1.126** 1.130 
 (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.2022) 
Protestant 1.203*** 1.204*** 1.432 
 (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.3267) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.971 0.971 1.436 
 (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.4623) 
Jewish 1.357* 1.364* 1.306 
 (0.1803) (0.1811) (0.5639) 
Islam 0.583*** 0.581*** 2.908+ 
 (0.0485) (0.0482) (1.7305) 
Other religions 0.931 0.930 1.026 
 (0.0844) (0.0843) (0.6163) 
    
Praying (1-5) 0.959*** 0.951*** 0.943* 
 (0.0121) (0.0057) (0.0246) 
Survey year (ESS round) 1.050*** 1.025* 1.036+ 
 (0.0089) (0.0124) (0.0194) 
Pray*Survey year 0.998  0.999 
 (0.0023)  (0.0050) 
    
Roman Catholic*Pray   1.068+ 
   (0.0381) 
Protestant*Pray   1.035 
   (0.0446) 
Eastern Orthodox*Pray   0.933 
   (0.0535) 
Jewish*Pray   0.860* 
   (0.0661) 
Islam*Pray   0.912 
   (0.0828) 
Other religions*Pray   1.004 
   (0.1020) 
    
Roman Catholic*Survey year   1.017 
   (0.0336) 
Protestant*Survey year   0.975 
   (0.0433) 
Eastern Orthodox*Survey year   0.943 
   (0.0584) 
Jewish*Survey year   1.004 
   (0.0697) 
Islam*Survey year   0.808* 
   (0.0774) 
Other religions*Survey year   0.948 
   (0.1031) 
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Table A.2:  Odd ratios role of religiosity and gender role attitudes on employment likelihood of women in 
different religion over time (Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 are in Table 4) (continued) 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Roman Catholic*Pray*Survey year   0.992 
   (0.0068) 
Protestant*Pray*Survey year   0.992 
   (0.0086) 
Eastern Orthodox*Pray*Survey year   1.021+ 
   (0.0117) 
Jewish*pray*Survey year   1.026+ 
   (0.0137) 
Islam*pray*Survey year   1.013 
   (0.0155) 
Other religions*pray*Survey year   1.008 
   (0.0188) 
Traditional gender attitudes (0-6) 0.846*** 0.809*** 0.842*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0208) (0.0346) 
Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year  1.010+ 1.008 
  (0.0051) (0.0083) 
Roman Catholic*Traditional gender attitudes   0.967 
   (0.0601) 
Protestant*Traditional gender attitudes   0.865 
   (0.0780) 
Eastern Orthodox*Traditional gender attitudes   1.027 
   (0.0918) 
Jewish*Traditional gender attitudes   0.965 
   (0.1464) 
Islam*Traditional gender attitudes   0.640** 
   (0.1062) 
Other religions*Traditional gender attitudes   0.807 
   (0.1660) 
Roman Catholic*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   0.991 
   (0.0126) 
Protestant*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   1.031 
   (0.0195) 
Eastern Orthodox*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   0.979 
   (0.0178) 
Jewish*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   1.009 
   (0.0270) 
Islam*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   1.061* 
   (0.0294) 
Other religions*Traditional gender attitudes*Survey year   1.047 
   (0.0419) 
N 39,233 39,233 39,233 






Table A.3:  Odd ratios for role of religiosity and gender role attitudes on employment likelihood of women 
belonging to different religions (weighted for population size) 
 1 2 3 4 
Survey years (ESS round) 1.069*** 1.068*** 1.052*** 1.052*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Religions (ref: no Religion)     
Roman Catholic 1.070 1.180** 1.089+ 1.185*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0601) (0.0508) (0.0605) 
Protestant  1.026 1.120+ 1.045 1.128* 
 (0.0581) (0.0667) (0.0594) (0.0675) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.903 0.988 0.905 0.979 
 (0.0754) (0.0851) (0.0757) (0.0845) 
Jewish 1.121 1.184 1.081 1.136 
 (0.2736) (0.2887) (0.2607) (0.2738) 
Islam 0.547*** 0.615*** 0.582*** 0.644*** 
 (0.0581) (0.0674) (0.0618) (0.0705) 
Other religions 0.894 1.020 0.907 1.018 
 (0.1131) (0.1336) (0.1151) (0.1334) 
Praying (1-5)  0.960***  0.965*** 
  (0.0086)  (0.0086) 
Traditional gender attitudes (0-6)   0.852*** 0.855*** 
   (0.0140) (0.0141) 
Observations 39,233 39,233 39,233 39,233 
Notes: All models are controlled for age, age2, education, marital status, having children at home and migration 
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das Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen nach Religionszugehörigkeit in Europa zwischen 2004 
und 2016 
Zusammenfassung 
Fragestellung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Zusammenhang von Religiosität, 
Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen und Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen in Europa zwischen 
2004 und 2016. 
Hintergrund: Religiosität und traditionelle Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen gelten als 
wesentliche Determinanten, die das Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen bestimmen. Dieser 
Beitrag argumentiert, dass diese beiden Faktoren differenziert betrachtet werden müssen, 
da der Einfluss, den Religiosität und Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen auf das 
Erwerbsverhalten ausübt, auf andere Mechanismen zurückgeführt werden muss. 
Methode: Es werden die Daten des European Social Survey (ESS) aus den Jahren 2004, 
2008, 2010 und 2016 (Welle 2, 4, 8, 10) verwendet, in denen u.a. Informationen zur 
Religiosität, Religionszugehörigkeit und zu den Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen für 16 
Länder vorliegen (N=39.233). 
Ergebnisse: Nach Kontrolle von Religiosität vergrößern sich die Unterschiede zwischen 
Personen ohne Religionszugehörigkeit und Personen mit römisch-katholischer, 
protestantischer oder jüdischer Religionszugehörigkeit. Hingegen reduzieren sich die 
Unterschiede zwischen Frauen mit islamischen und orthodoxem Glaubens in Vergleich 
zu säkularisierten Frauen. Die Hinzunahme von Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen erklärt 
die Erwerbsunterschiede nur marginal. 
Schlussfolgerung: Dieser Beitrag unterstützt die Idee, dass Religiosität und traditionelle 
Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen durch verschiedene Mechanismen mit dem 
Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen verbunden sind. Über die Zeit ist die Erwerbsneigung für 
alle Frauen, unabhängig von der konfessionellen Zugehörigkeit gestiegen, abgesehen von 
islamischen Frauen, wo wir einen Rückgang beobachten können. 
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